Our decisions are accompanied by a subjective sense of confidence about whether the choices we have made are correct or erroneous. We investigate the information on which these confidence judgments are based, and how they relate to the decision itself, by studying how fluctuations in perceptual information influence decisions and second-order metacognitive evaluations of confidence and accuracy. Human participants judged which of two dynamically changing stimuli contained more dots, under instructions emphasizing either speed or accuracy. Crucially, stimuli remained visible for one second after the decision, before participants rated their confidence in their choice. We found that confidence and error detection depended on the balance of stimulus evidence accumulated in the periods both preceding and following the initial decision, regardless of whether instructions emphasized speed or accuracy. These findings suggest a shared computational basis for error detection and confidence judgments, with implications for current models of metacognitive evaluation of decision processes.
By contrast, studies of metacognitive judgments of confidence have typically used stimulus ambiguity rather than time pressure as a source of errors, for example, asking participants to identify the longer of two lines of very similar length (Henmon, 1911) , or to detect a Gabor patch of slightly greater contrast than frequent standard stimuli (Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010) , before giving a graded rating of confidence in their initial choice. In such experiments, participants often remain unsure of whether they responded correctly or incorrectly, even when judgments are unspeeded, and are typically asked to judge their confidence on a scale ranging from feeling that they are guessing to feeling certain they are correct (i.e., with no option to indicate explicit error detection; Fleming et al., 2010 Fleming et al., , 2015 Maniscalco & Lau, 2012) .
Influential early theories of confidence correspondingly did not allow for changes of mind (ChoMs) and error detection (which depend on postdecisional processing), instead proposing that confidence reflects features of the decision process up to the time of the decision, such as the balance of evidence accumulated for competing response options (Vickers, 2001; Vickers & Packer, 1982) or the time taken to reach the decision (Audley, 1960) . According to these decision-locus models (and more recent variants; see Kepecs & Mainen, 2014; Kepecs, Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008; Kiani, Corthell, & Shadlen, 2014; Zylberberg, Barttfeld, & Sigman, 2012) , confidence depends critically on the strength and consistency of evidence accumulated up to the time of the decision.
However, recent evidence indicates that decision confidence, like error detection, depends critically on continued processing of available evidence even after an initial decision is made. For example, the resolution of confidence judgments-the degree to which subjective confidence predicts objective accuracy-is improved when greater time is allowed between initial choice and subsequent confidence judgment (Moran, Teodorescu, & Usher, 2015; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; Resulaj et al., 2009; van den Berg, Anandalingam, et al., 2016; Yu, Pleskac, & Zeigenfuse, 2015) . One recent study proposed that this could be related to integration into confidence judgments of late evidence that is processed between internal commitment to a choice and overt expression of the decision (van den Berg, Anandalingam, et al., 2016) . This study found that confidence varies according to stochastic fluctuations in evidence presented immediately preceding the overt response. Extending this idea, another recent study (Moran et al., 2015) found that, when possible, people continue to accrue perceptual evidence presented after their decision to inform their confidence judgments, confirming the crucial role of postdecisional process on confidence. Meanwhile, electroencephalography (EEG) studies suggest that confidence and error judgments are reflected in common neural signatures (in particular, the Pe component) that unfold in the period after response (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Murphy, Robertson, Harty, & O'Connell, 2015) . Formal models of this postdecision accumulation process suggest that these postdecisional locus models may provide an integrated account of confidence and error judgments (Moran et al., 2015; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; Yu et al., 2015) .
This convergence notwithstanding, several open questions remain, which form the basis for the present study. Although it seems uncontroversial that a decision maker should take advantage of additional information presented after initial choice to form a more accurate confidence judgment and possibly revise that decision, there has been little systematic investigation of the distinct influences of pre-and postdecisional information on confidence and error detection. In particular, it remains unclear what impact predecisional evidence has compared with postdecisional evidence on evaluations of decisions. Interestingly, although some predecisional locus models predict that confidence should reflect the evidence available at the time of the response, postdecisional locus models have proposed various ways by which evidence continues to be accumulated to inform confidence (Moran et al., 2015: collapsing confidence boundary model; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010: two-stage dynamic signal detection model; van den Berg, Zylberberg, et al., 2016) . Going beyond locus models that focus only on the evidence available at a single point in time, our first goal was to investigate the time course over which decision evidence influences confidence judgments, error detection, and choice, both in the period leading up to the moment of the choice and in the postdecision period leading up to the moment of the confidence judgment.
Our second goal was to determine how speed-accuracy tradeoffs affect these dynamics of evidence accumulation for confidence judgments and error detection. It remains to be established whether speeded or self-paced decisions rely to the same extent on pre-versus postdecisional evidence-a salient question given the differing emphasis on speeded versus unspeeded tasks in studies of error detection and confidence, respectively (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012) , and evidence that the speed-accuracy trade-off affects confidence and error detection (Baranski & Petrusic, 1998; Gehring et al., 1993) . Although some earlier studies investigated this question and found indirect evidence that speed-accuracy trade-off might alter the balance between pre-and postdecisional evidence (Moran et al., 2015) , no direct analysis has explored the time course of this effect.
Our final goal was to further investigate the relationship between confidence and explicit error detection judgments. Only a few studies to date have investigated explicit error detection and confidence in the same experiment (Baranski & Petrusic, 1994; Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Scheffers & Coles, 2000; Yu et al., 2015) .
It therefore remains to be tested how these two judgments are related and whether they rely on corresponding dynamics of stimulus evidence.
To answer these questions, we present a systematic investigation of the decision dynamics supporting error detection, ChoMs, and confidence judgments in a perceptual judgment task. Participants judged which of two dynamically changing stimuli contained more dots, on average, over time (see Figure 1) , responding under instructions emphasizing either speed or accuracy, before providing a graded confidence judgment about the initial decision. Crucially, we directly retrieved what in the stimulus dynamics led participants to commit errors and detect them, using reverse correlation methods van den Berg, Anandalingam, et al., 2016; Zylberberg et al., 2012) to probe how stochastic signal fluctuations in the stimuli influenced participants' decisions and subsequent metacognitive evaluations. Importantly, in our design, stimuli continued to be visible after participants made their decision. Therefore, participants could continue sampling information before indicating their confidence, enabling us to determine how much they relied on postdecision evidence to evaluate the accuracy of their initial decision. Manipulation of time pressure induced participants to make errors, some of which reThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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CHARLES AND YEUNG Figure 1 . Experimental procedure. Stimuli consisted of a stream of images updated every 50 ms displaying two boxes containing dots at random positions in a 20 ϫ 20 array. The participants' task was to determine which of the two boxes contained more dots on average. The number of dots in each box was drawn from two normal distributions centered on a high (212 dots) and a low (188 dots) value. The time the participant had left to respond was indicated by a bar on the top of the screen that gradually filled up. Participants were instructed whether the bar would fill slowly (accuracy block) or quickly (speed block) at the beginning of each block. Importantly, the stimulus stream continued to be displayed for 1,000 ms after each response. Participants were then asked to rate the confidence they had in their response on a scale going from "Sure I made an error" to "Sure I responded correctly." See the online article for the color version of this figure. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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DYNAMICS OF CONFIDENCE JUDGMENTS mained undetected, allowing us to contrast dynamics of stimulus evidence associated with decisions that were or were not followed by a ChoM, providing further insight into the mechanisms of error detection and confidence judgments.
Method Participants
Twenty-three right-handed participants, with normal or correctedto-normal vision, gave informed consent to participate in the experiment (mean age ϭ 25.1 years). As our analysis focused on subjective confidence reports, five participants were discarded for using the confidence scale in a discretized manner, in which they used the end points or the middle of the scale in more than 30% of the whole of the trials, which left an insufficient number of trials to perform key analyses. This left 18 participants (11 female; mean age ϭ 25 years) in the final sample.
Task and Procedure
Stimuli were presented on a 20-in. CRT (Trinitron, Dell) monitor with a 60-Hz refresh rate using the MATLAB toolbox Psychtoolbox3. Stimuli were 4.7 cm large, resulting in a visual angle of 4.48°when viewed from 60 cm, and were placed 3.9 cm (3.6°) to the left and right of the fixation cross.
The trial started with a small increase in the size of the fixation cross (100 ms duration), reminding the participant to fixate the center of the screen. After 100 ms, two empty gray boxes then appeared on the screen signaling the beginning of the trial. After 300 ms, dots appeared at random positions within the two gray boxes. The display was then updated every 50 ms, with the dots in each box changing randomly and independently in position and number.
The two boxes were 20 ϫ 20 resolution, thus containing, at most, 400 dots. The number of dots presented at each time sample in each box was drawn from two normal distributions, respectively, around either a high (212 dots) or low (188 dots) mean value and variance of 40 dots for both.
Participants' task was to identify the box with the higher mean. Participants responded with a left or right mouse-button click corresponding to the box they judged to contain more dots. Importantly, the boxes continued to be displayed for 1,000 ms after the participant's response, again updated every 50 ms, allowing the participant to continue sampling the information after their initial decision.
Two types of blocks varied in time pressure. In speed blocks, participants were required to respond in less than 800 ms, whereas in accuracy blocks, the instructions emphasized the importance of accurate responding within a correspondingly lenient response deadline of 3,000 ms. In both block types, the time left to respond was indicated by a bar on the top of the screen that gradually filled up at each time sample.
At the end of each trial, after the dot stimulus display disappeared (always 1,000 ms after their perceptual decision), participants were asked to indicate how confident they were in their preceding decision by moving a cursor along a 51-point scale ranging from sure error (scored as 0 on the scale) to sure correct (scored as 50 on the scale). Additionally, the word Guess was displayed in the middle (scored as 25 on the scale), which also corresponded to the initial position of the response cursor (to ensure that it would take the same time to move the cursor to each end of the scale, equating the effort and time to signal an error and a correct response). No time pressure was imposed for the confidence response. After participants had registered their confidence rating, the next trial started after a blank screen interval of 500 ms.
Participants completed 12 blocks of 40 trials. There were six blocks with each speed-accuracy instruction, randomly intermixed. Altogether, the experiment lasted approximately 60 min.
Analysis of Pre-and Postdecisional Evidence
Our first analysis quantified the evidence participants saw when making correct versus erroneous decisions and when subjectively evaluating these decisions as correct or incorrect. For each trial, we extracted the number of dots at each time sample in each box. This allowed us to retrieve, for each trial, the distributions of dot numbers in each box over time for two time periods of interest: from the onset of the stimulus to the response (i.e., the predecisional interval), and from the response to the disappearance of the stimulus 1,000 ms later (i.e., the postdecisional interval). To quantify the strength of the evidence for these two time periods on each trial, we used a standardized approach to measure the degree of overlap between the two distributions, calculating the receiver operating characteristic curve and associated area under the curve (AUC). These measures allowed us to quantify, for each trial, the degree of discriminability of the box with the higher mean number of dots compared with the one with the lower mean number in each of these time periods. The advantage of this approach compared with simply calculating the average difference in the number of dots is that it provides a standardized measure of discriminability that is also sensitive to stimulus variability, thus quantifying the impact of the stimulus fluctuations on task difficulty. The AUC varied between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating that the evidence unambiguously favored the objectively correct response, the midpoint (0.5) indicating that the evidence was perfectly ambiguous (i.e., noise fluctuations, on average, perfectly cancelled out the underlying difference in mean dot numbers between the two boxes), and values below 0.5 indicating that objective evidence favored the alternative response (i.e., noise fluctuations were sufficiently large to outweigh the underlying mean difference).
The obtained trial-by-trial AUC values were then averaged together for each participant according to the conditions corresponding to the factorial combination of block type (speed vs. accuracy), time interval (pre-vs. postdecisional), objective decision accuracy (correct vs. error), and subsequent metacognitive evaluation (no ChoM vs. ChoM). Some participants had too few ChoMs to compute AUC values across the full factorial designthis was true for one participant in speed blocks and five participants in accuracy blocks. To maximize power, we therefore performed a three-way repeated measure ANOVA separately for speed and accuracy blocks, with the factors Time Interval, Decision Accuracy, and Metacognitive Evaluation, allowing us to retain 17 participants for the former condition and 13 in the latter. Effect sizes were computed using the partial eta-squared ( p 2 ) measure for ANOVAs, whereas pairwise Cohen's d measure (d z ; Cohen, 1988) was computed for additional t tests. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Reverse Correlation Analysis
To assess the dynamics of stimulus evidence predicting error detection and confidence judgments, our next analysis used a reverse correlation approach (Resulaj et al., 2009; Zylberberg et al., 2012) . This method correlates observed behavior with the momentary, stochastic fluctuations in evidence that were built into our dot display stimuli. We separated trials according to block type, accuracy, and ChoM, and retrieved, for each trial, the variation in the number of dots across time in each of the two boxes-the correct one and the incorrect one ( Figure 2 , top row). We then normalized the two obtained time courses by subtracting the mean number of dots in each box, respectively, and divided by the across-time sample variance ( Figure 2 , second row). The obtained trial-by-trial time courses were then individually realigned to the onset of the motor response and averaged separately for the low-mean and the high-mean boxes, and then averaged across participants. To avoid averaging conditions with too few data points, we excluded from averaging data points that contained fewer than five trials and time samples for which fewer than five participants had data. For display purposes, participants' individual time courses were temporally smoothed by averaging together values of the two preceding and two following time samples. Statistics, however, were computed on unsmoothed data.
To determine the moment at which the number of dots in the two boxes significantly deviated from each other, we computed between-participants statistics on the obtained averaged time series using a cluster-based nonparametric test with Monte Carlo randomization (adapted from Maris & Oostenveld, 2007) . This method allowed us to identify clusters of time points in which time series of the two stimuli were significantly different while correcting for multiple comparisons (see the online supplemental materials).
Statistical Power
The main analysis proposed in the present study investigated the time course of stimulus fluctuations by means of within-participant nonparametric permutation statistics. This is a new analysis for which no empirical estimation of effect size is available in the literature. As such, the required sample size could not be estimated by means of a classical power analysis. Sample size was therefore chosen to be comparable with the previous studies most closely related to the present one (van den Berg, Zylberberg, et al., 2016 , n ϭ 6; Zylberberg et al., 2012 , n ϭ 19). Nonetheless, we are able to use our secondary analysis of the AUC (see Results Analysis of evidence available before and after the decision) to estimate the a priori statistical power of the analysis given our sample size. With a sample of 15 participants (the smallest number allowing for full factorial analysis with ANOVA on the AUC with time interval, accuracy, and ChoM as within-participant factors), the smallest effect size detectable would be p 2 ϭ 0.11 for ANOVA and Cohen's d ϭ 0.78 for a two-tailed t test (both taking ␣ ϭ .05 and power ϭ 0.8, and assuming no correlation between repeated measures and no correction for nonsphericity, using G-Power software). The main effect of interest reported in the article (a threeway interaction between decision accuracy, time interval, and presence of a ChoM on the AUC value) exceeded this limit, suggesting that our design had appropriate statistical power.
Results
Task Performance
Participants judged which of two boxes contained on average more dots (see Figure 1) , with varying time pressure. We first verified that our experimental manipulation of time pressure affected participants' speed-accuracy trade-off as intended. Unsurprisingly, we found a significant difference in response times (RTs) between the speed and accuracy blocks (mean RTs ϭ 638 ms vs. 1,681 ms; Figure 3A ), Cohen's d ϭ Ϫ2.82, t(17) ϭ Ϫ12.0 p Ͻ .001. Accuracy was significantly lower in blocks with speed versus accuracy emphasis (68% vs. 80% correct; Figure 3B ), Cohen's d ϭ Ϫ2.01, t(17) ϭ Ϫ8.54, p Ͻ .001. Correspondingly, average confidence was lower in blocks with speed versus accuracy emphasis (63% vs. 68%; Figure 3C ), Cohen's d ϭ Ϫ1.44, t(17) ϭ Ϫ6.13, p Ͻ .001, showing that participants were able to monitor variations in their performance across conditions.
We next split the data according to trial-by-trial accuracy and investigated the use of the confidence scale separately for error and correct trials ( Figure 3D to 3G). We discretized the confidence scale to separate trials that participants judged as correct (righthand side of the confidence scale) from those judged as errors and characterized by a revision of the initial decision (i.e., ChoM, left-hand side of the scale). An ANOVA on these proportions revealed that, in line with previous research (Rabbitt, 1966a) , ChoMs occurred more frequently following error than correct responses, F(1, 17) ϭ 110.35, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ 0.87. ChoMs were more frequent in speed than in accuracy blocks, F(1, 17) ϭ 41.277, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ 0.71. Furthermore, an interaction between accuracy and block type indicated that error detection rates were higher in speed blocks than in accuracy blocks, whereas similar low rates of ChoMs were observed following correct responses across block types, F(1, 17) ϭ 18.09, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ 0.51. As a final observation, apparent in Figure 3 is that a sizable proportion of confidence responses fell exactly at the midpoint of the confidence scale, corresponding to the guess response and the initial position of the cursor. The frequency distribution of responses on the confidence scale suggests that participants remained on this initial "guess" response for a range of low confidence responses that were therefore little used, indicating that a better methodology would have been to randomize the starting position of the confidence cursor. The proportion of guess responses was higher for errors than for correct trials, F(1, 17) ϭ 11.67, p ϭ .003, p 2 ϭ 0.41. No reliable difference between block types was observed (F Ͻ 1). As these "guess" trials could not be labeled as true ChoMs or perceived correct responses, we excluded them from further analysis.
Analysis of Evidence Available Before and After the Decision
The next analysis quantified the evidence that led participants to make correct responses, errors, and, on occasion, to detect their errors. We used an AUC metric to quantify the degree to which the objectively presented evidence favored the correct or incorrect decision across time points and trials (with values greater than 0.5 indicating evidence favoring the correct decision, up to a maximum value of 1.0 where the evidence for this choice is perfectly This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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DYNAMICS OF CONFIDENCE JUDGMENTS unambiguous), how this evidence led to correct and erroneous decisions, and how it influenced the occurrence of ChoMs. The advantage of such an approach is that it allows quantification of objective stimulus discriminability using a standardized measure. Note, however, that results did not differ qualitatively when performing the same analysis using the raw difference in dot number between the two boxes. AUC scores were averaged separately for evidence presented in the pre-versus postdecisional period, and separately for each participant, for correct and error trials that were followed or not by a ChoM, before averaging across participants. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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We found a main effect of decision accuracy on the AUC in both block types (speed blocks, F [1, 87] Ϫ3 , p 2 ϭ 0.70), because this effect was, of course, restricted to evidence presented predecisionally. Notably, follow-up t tests indicated that predecision AUC for all conditions was significantly larger than 0.5 (Figure 4 , all ps Ͻ 10 Ϫ4 ). Thus, even for error trials, objective evidence available at the time of the decision favored the correct response ( Figure 4A, 4B) .
Crucially, AUC scores also varied reliably as a function of whether participants changed their minds to indicate that an initial decision was incorrect, with a reliable main effect of ChoMs for accuracy blocks , F(1, 71) Importantly, follow-up analyses run separately for each time interval revealed that these effects were observed in both the preand postdecision AUC scores: Evidence in favor of the correct decision was stronger (i.e., AUC was higher) on trials in which Figure 3 . Response time, accuracy, and confidence for both types of blocks. A-C: Mean response time, accuracy, and confidence for speed and accuracy blocks. D-G: Average distribution over participants of the use of the confidence scale for correct (D-E) and error trials (F-G), separately for speed (D-F) and accuracy blocks (E-G), with proportion of certain correct (confidence ϭ 100%), perceived correct (50% Ͻ confidence Ͻ 100%), guess (confidence ϭ 50%), changes of mind (ChoMs: 0% Ͻ confidence Ͻ 50%), and certain error (confidence ϭ 0%) trials separately for correct and error trials. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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participants detected their errors than for undetected errors, both in the pre-and postdecision periods for both speed and accuracy blocks (see Table 1 ). Meanwhile, evidence in favor of the correct decision was stronger when correct decisions were judged as such than when they were misjudged as errors, in the predecision period only for speed emphasis blocks and in the postdecision period for both block types (see Table 1 ).
The effects just described relate to analyses including all trials. Control analyses confirmed that these effects were preserved in analyses excluding the subset of trials in which, because of noise fluctuations in dot numbers, the evidence presented up to the time of the response actually favored the incorrect response (i.e., trialwise AUC Ͻ 0.5; see Figure S1 of the online supplemental materials). These trials occurred more frequently in speed blocks (15% of trials vs. 3.5% in accuracy blocks),and were associated with faster RTs than for other trials ( 
Reverse Correlation Analysis
Our next set of analyses focused on the dynamics of evidence accumulation influencing both initial decision and metacognitive evaluation. To this end, we ran a reverse correlation analysis to retrieve, for each time point, the empirical kernels on which initial decisions and subsequent confidence judgments are based, according to cross-trial averages of systematic biases in noise fluctuations across different trial subsets (Resulaj et al., 2009; Zylberberg et al., 2012) . Figure 2 illustrates the logic of the analysis, showing stimulus-aligned averages of noise fluctuations in the low-mean box (i.e., the box the box with fewer dots on average; red lines [light gray]) and high-mean box (i.e., the box with more dots on average; blue lines [dark gray]) for correct trials separately in speed and accuracy blocks. On correct trials, noise fluctuations in both boxes favored the ultimate choice. Thus, the average noise fluctuation was positive in the high-mean box (i.e., it contained more dots than its true already high mean) and negative in the low-mean box (i.e., it contained even fewer dots than its already low mean). The difference between boxes was significant from 50 ms to 700 ms in speed blocks, and 50 ms to 850 ms in accuracy blocks. In this way, the reverse correlation method identified time periods in which stimulus evidence consistently influenced participants' decisions across trials (cf. Zylberberg et al., 2012) . However, this stimulus-aligned analysis provides limited information about signal dynamics in relation to the time of the decision.
Our key analyses focused on trial-by-trial time courses aligned to the onset of the response (see Figure 5) . Considering first the correct trials that were judged by participants as correct (i.e., no ChoM), averaged evidence carried in noise fluctuations signifi- Note. AUC ϭ area under the curve; ChoM ϭ change of mind. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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cantly deviated from the mean in the period from Ϫ650 ms to 0 ms before the onset of the response for speed blocks ( Figure 5A ) and from Ϫ950 ms to Ϫ300 ms for accuracy blocks ( Figure 5B ). These findings indicate that consistent fluctuations in evidence strength were only observed just prior to initiation of the motor response, whereas evidence presented at the earliest periods of stimulus processing did not systematically correlate with the decision reached. This pattern is necessarily observed in speed blocks, in which a tight decision deadline was imposed, but the pattern was similarly evident in blocks with accuracy emphasis, in which average RT exceeded 1,500 ms. Turning next to error trials that were not followed by a ChoM (i.e., errors that remained undetected), analysis of signal dynamics revealed the inverse pattern to the one observed in correct trials: On these trials, evidence preceding the response strongly favored the incorrect decision, with the averaged noise fluctuation being reliably negative in the high-mean box (i.e., containing fewer dots than its true underlying mean) and positive in the low-mean box (i.e., containing more dots than its true underlying mean). These differences peaked at Ϫ500 ms and Ϫ700 ms before the response for speed ( Figure 5G ) and accuracy emphasis blocks ( Figure 5H ), respectively. Thus, as with the evidence kernel observed on correct trials, deviations in noise fluctuations were observed in both the low-and high-mean boxes, suggesting sampling of both parts of the stimulus display. Interestingly, contrary to the pattern observed for correct trials without ChoMs, these differences persisted even after the decision for both types of blocks, albeit reaching significance only in accuracy blocks ( Figure 5H ; 50 ms to 350 ms after the response time period). It appears that errors remained undetected only when noise fluctuations continued to favor the incorrect response after it was produced. Overall, therefore, these results show that errors that remain undetected are characterized by noise fluctuations that vote against the correct response and continue to do so after the initial decision.
A different pattern was observed for errors followed by ChoMs. These trials were marked by evidence favoring the incorrect response in the early time window before the response, an effect that was significant between Ϫ700 ms and Ϫ400 ms relative to the response for speed emphasis blocks ( Figure 5E ), and from Ϫ1200 to Ϫ500 ms for accuracy blocks ( Figure 5F ). However, the pattern reversed around Ϫ300 ms before the response, such that noise fluctuations began to favor the correct response. In speed emphasis blocks, this effect was reliable from Ϫ200 ms before the response to 850 ms after it; in accuracy blocks, the effect was reliable from 100 ms to 400 ms after the response. The pattern suggests that although evidence presented before the response influenced the initial incorrect decision, evidence presented immediately before the response and for a sustained period afterward continued to be accumulated, which can lead to a ChoM about the decision and therefore detection that the initial response was incorrect. Interestingly, a similar pattern was observed in correct trials followed by a ChoM (Figure 5C , 5D), with dynamics of evidence accumulation also exhibiting a reversal in the direction of evidence regarding the choice. However, these trials occurred rarely (see Figure 3 ) and the analysis was correspondingly underpowered, with the only statistically reliable effect being a brief period in speed emphasis blocks This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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(50 ms to 350 ms after the response) in which noise fluctuations favored the incorrect response.
Correlation Between Trial-by-Trial Balance of Evidence and Confidence Before and After the Response
Collectively, the reverse correlation results (see Figure 5 ) indicate that error detection is influenced by evidence presented before and after the decision. However, these results do not indicate whether subtle variations in the level of confidence in correct decisions can likewise be explained in terms of fluctuations in evidence sampling, with particular interest in whether the ultimate confidence judgment is influenced by evidence presented after the initial choice. To investigate this issue, we computed the cumulative evidence for different levels of confidence observed specifically on correct trials without ChoMs (using cumulative evidence so that small differences in evidence are more apparent than in the moment-by-moment reverse correlation plots shown in Figure 5 ). For this analysis, we divided the correct-trial confidence distribution into quartile bins and then sorted trials into bins and averaged the cumulative evidence over time across trials within each bin, separately for the low-and high-mean boxes. The resulting curves showed systematic variations as a function of explicitly reported confidence (Figure 6 , inserts), with higher confidence observed as a function of higher cumulative evidence in the high-mean box and lower cumulative evidence in the low-mean box. These differences emerged in the preresponse period but continued to develop well after the response into the postdecisional period, both for speed and accuracy emphasis blocks.
To confirm this result and test its significance, we computed the balance of evidence between the two boxes (i.e., the degree to which noise fluctuations on average favored the correct vs. incorrect response) and regressed it against the ultimate confidence level. We performed these regressions separately for each participant for cumulative evidence from the time interval before the response and after it to determine whether pre-and postresponse evidence independently influenced the ultimate confidence judgment. We found significant positive correlations between evidence strength and confidence for both time intervals. This result was observed for both speed and accuracy blocks, indicating that it was not only an effect of speed-accuracy trade-off that occurs when a tight response deadline is imposed (Figure 6 ; main box plot, correlation coefficients across participants significantly greater than 0; speed block, preresponse, t [17] 
Discussion
The present study provides a systematic investigation of the way in which evidence-in terms of stochastic fluctuations in dynamically evolving stimuli-predicts the occurrence of errors, ChoMs, detection of errors, and graded levels of confidence in an initial decision. Our findings extend previous results (Murphy et al., 2015; van den Berg, Anandalingam, et al., 2016) in providing only partial support for current models of error processing and decision confidence. Thus, with some notable exceptions (e.g., van den Berg, Zylberberg, et al., 2016) , extant models of decision confidence place emphasis on information available exclusively at the time of choice (e.g., Kepecs & Mainen, 2014; Kiani et al., 2014; Zylberberg et al., 2012) or that is accumulated postdecisionally (Moran et al., 2015; Yu et al., 2015) , but not both. Meanwhile, models of error processing focus almost exclusively on postdecisional processing as the basis for error detection (Summerfield & Yeung, 2013) . Importantly, we found that confidence judgments and error detection are similarly influenced by the strength of the evidence presented both before and after the response, and that this dual influence was observed regardless of whether participants responded under speed or accuracy emphasis.
These findings shed new light on the mechanisms of error detection and confidence judgments. Early models of confidence were based on the intuition that confidence should reflect the strength of evidence supporting the initial decision (Audley, 1960; Festinger, 1943; Vickers & Packer, 1982) . This assumption provides an elegant account of many empirically observed features of confidence judgments such as their dependence on task difficulty and response time (Kiani et al., 2014; Vickers & Packer, 1982) . More recently however, these decision locus models have been altered to capture the intuition that evaluation of a decision should be sensitive to continuing reflection even after an initial choice, thus allowing for ChoMs (Moran et al., 2015; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; Resulaj et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2015) and an account of how we sometimes realize that we have made a mistake, even in the absence of external feedback (Charles, King, & Dehaene, 2014; Murphy et al., 2015; van den Berg, Anandalingam, et al., 2016; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012) .
Our finding that both pre-and postdecisional evidence impacts confidence and error detection contradicts models that view confidence as reflecting only the balance of evidence up to the point of decision (Kiani et al., 2014; Zylberberg et al., 2012) . Similarly, this finding seems difficult to reconcile with postdecisional locus models of confidence that make the assumption that confidence reflects only continued processing after the response. In particular, classic standard drift diffusion models (Link, 1975) that assume that a decision is reached when a fixed threshold is crossed make the prediction that predecisional evidence is also constant between trials and, therefore, that confidence should be determined solely by evidence accumulated postdecisionally.
Although we find that error detection becomes more likely when postdecisional evidence more strongly favors the objectively correct response, as all existing theories would predict (following Rabbitt, 1966a) , we find that detection is also more likely following errors that are based on initially weaker evidence. Indeed, our results confirm that the predecisional balance of evidence has a lasting impact on decision evaluations made hundreds of milliseconds later. It remains to be established how such results could be reconciled with existing theories that focus solely on postdecisional accumulation of evidence against an initial choice as the core mechanism of error detection (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012; Summerfield & Yeung, 2013) . Our results seem to be more easily accounted for by a modified model of first-order decisions (van den Berg, Anandalingam, et al., 2016) , which hypothesizes a race between two separate accumulators for each possible decision. According to this view, confidence reflects the balance of evidence between the competing accumulators, and error detection and This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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ChoMs occur when there is a reversal in the balance of evidence between pre-and postdecisional evidence accumulation, as we observed in our results. Despite this convergence, it remains to be demonstrated whether this view of confidence as a simple "delayed" first-order decision (Resulaj et al., 2009; van den Berg, Anandalingam, et al., 2016) that is, reflecting an evolving balance of evidence that continues to develop even after an initial choice-can entirely account for our findings. Indeed, a recent EEG study suggests that although similar neural signatures of evidence accumulation are apparent before and after the response, postdecisional process differ qualitatively as they accumulate evidence on the likelihood of having made an error rather than votes in favor of one choice or another (Murphy et al., 2015) . This evidence converges with theoretical models of confidence as an explicit representation of uncertainty in choice that is distinct from the decision process per se (Pouget, Drugowitsch, & Kepecs, 2016) as well as evidence from neuroimaging (Fleming et al., 2010) and neuropsychology (Chua, Pergolizzi, & Figure 6 . Correlation between level of evidence and confidence in correct trials. The figure depicts the boxplot (central line, median, bottom and top lines: 25th and 75th quantiles; whiskers: most extreme data points not considered as outliers) of the betas of individual regression across trials between the average balance of evidence between the two stimuli in the pre and postdecisional time interval for speed and accuracy blocks. Insert depicts the cumulative sum of the evidence in the low-mean (red [below zero]) and the high-mean (blue [above zero]) box according to confidence bin (darker color ϭ higher confidence).
‫ء‬ p Ͻ .05. ‫ءء‬ p Ͻ .001. ‫ءءء‬ p Ͻ .0001. See the online article for the color version of this figure. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
49 Weintraub, 2014; Fleming & Lau, 2014) suggesting distinct neural bases for first-and second-order decision processes. The present study does not provide direct evidence for this distinction, but our findings are certainly compatible with the view that confidence does not reflect precisely the same accumulation process as the first-order decision. A valuable extension of the present work would therefore be to investigate how activity in distinct decisionand evaluation-related regions varies with dynamic, stochastic fluctuations in evidence of the kind studied here. One interesting aspect of our findings is that, perhaps surprisingly, the influence of evidence accumulated both pre-and postdecisionally was apparent regardless of whether instructions emphasized speed or accuracy in responding. Indeed, influence of postdecisional evidence was observed even for correct trials in accuracy blocks, which had the longest response times and for which evidence at the time of the response was already high. Although it may appear obvious that an observer should integrate new information to his confidence judgment, an alternative possibility when no time pressure is applied to the decision could be to wait to reach total certainty before providing a response. It is therefore interesting to observe that this was not the strategy deployed by participants, who appeared instead to make an initial choice and to continue to sample the evidence to further evaluate their choice. This result could be considered an artifact of the present experimental design in which postdecisional evidence was always available. However, it could also suggest that integration of evidence preceding and following an initial choice is an essential feature of confidence judgments. As such, this finding seems to contradict the view that integration of postdecisional evidence into confidence judgment occurs only when high speed pressure is applied, forcing participants to produce a response before a decision has truly been reached, as could be suggested by studies that emphasize the role of postdecisional evidence in revising initial decisions (Hilgenstock, Weiss, & Witte, 2014; Moran et al., 2015; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012; Yu et al., 2015) . More research will be needed to explore whether confidence in itself guides the continuation of information processing after an initial choice is made (Desender, Boldt, & Yeung, 2018) and explore how allowing delayed confidence judgment influences how a first-order decision threshold is set.
At a more detailed level, in both pre-and postdecisional periods, we found an influence on confidence of fluctuations in evidence corresponding to both the chosen and unchosen options. As such, our results seem to conflict with some reports suggesting that confidence, unlike choice, is influenced solely by the strength of evidence favoring the selected option (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Nickerson, 1998; Peters et al., 2017; Zylberberg et al., 2012) . Instead, our findings appear to suggest a symmetrical influence on confidence of evidence favoring the two options, consistent with other recent studies (Yu et al., 2015) and the hypothesis that confidence reflects the balance of evidence between choice options (van den Berg, Anandalingam, et al., 2016) . Note that our results do not completely exclude the possibility that participants selectively sampled information to determine their confidence. Indeed, the design of our task allows participants to sample only one of the two boxes to determine which correspond to the high and low mean value. Averaging across trials could then result in an overall effect of symmetry between the selected and unselected options, while participants would in fact sample alternatively one of the stimuli. This interpretation is, however, unlikely considering the instructions given to the participants to fixate the center the screen and pay attention to both stimuli. Further research will be needed to explore alternative hypotheses explaining discrepancies between our results and those of earlier studies (Peters et al., 2017) . For example, we used a confidence rating scale ranging from correct to error, in contrast to a scale from guess to high confidence in previous studies (Peters et al., 2017; Zylberberg et al., 2012) . Perhaps the latter scale leads to a tendency toward confirmation bias in confidence ratings by not providing participants with the possibility of revising their judgment.
Finally, our results extend previous studies that, like ours, attempt to link error detection and confidence judgments by treating them as part of a single continuum of decision evaluations (Baranski & Petrusic, 1994; Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Scheffers & Coles, 2000) . We interpret our findings-of a shared dependence of confidence and error judgments on both pre-and postdecisional evidence-as evidence that they reflect a common underlying metacognitive evaluation process. We favor this interpretation over a possible alternative view-that the shared dependence we observe is an artifact of forcing participants to rate errors and confidence on a single scale-for several reasons. First, by their very definitions, confidence and error judgments fall on a meaningful continuum-a subjective estimate of p(correct) that varies from 0 to 1-rather than being artificially and arbitrarily forced together (cf. dumping effects in perceptual ratings, e.g., Frank, van der Klaauw, & Schifferstein, 1993) . Second, our analyses were not biased to find correlations between pre-and postdecisional evidence and both judgment types-indeed, we did not predict a priori that we would see an influence of predecisional evidence on error detection, yet our analyses revealed this effect. Finally, previous studies have shown that variations toward both ends of the error-confidence continuum are associated with common neural signatures-graded amplitude changes in well-characterized postdecisional event-related brain potential components (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010) .
At a more methodological level, our design shows the distinction between detected and undetected errors in the dynamics of evidence accumulation process: Even in blocks emphasizing accuracy, a significant proportion of errors remained undetected, whereas others were correctly identified as mistakes, and these trials were associated with differing evidence dynamics, as revealed by reverse correlation analysis. This result highlights the importance of allowing confidence judgment to extend beyond "unsure" rating and to allow explicit error detection. Indeed, our pattern of results suggests that classical confidence study which distinguish only "high" and "low" confidence (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Moran et al., 2015; Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010 ) might miss some important findings by neglecting differences in information processing within the "low confidence" category.
In conclusion, the present study sheds new light on the dynamics of evidence accumulation relating to error-detection and ChoMs, showing that confidence and error judgments integrate information both before and after a decision is produced. These results force us to revise our view on classical models of metadecision, providing evidence that a common process evaluating the overall signal
